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Abstract 
Kenyan political discourse has been dominated by elites and politics of self-interest 
since independence in 1963. Kenya is notorious for its levels of corruption and 
questionable levels of accountability. The persistence of this status quo has defined 
the Kenyan democratic transition as one of 'dominant power politics' and epitomises 
Ghanian economist George Ayittey's description of the 'African Vampire State'. The 
post-election violence and controversy in 2007 – 2008 led to both a new constitution 
and a power-sharing agreement between the two major parties; these events have 
been described as the 'rebirth' of Kenya. This paper confronts the extent to which this 
'rebirth' has had an impact on the contemporary political and economic climate within 
Kenya and assesses the extent to which elite dominance has shaped and continues 
to shape Kenyan political discourse. 
 
 





The Staying Power of Self Interest: 
Kenya's Unshakeable Elites 
'A Very Democratic Distribution of Spoils'  
- John Githongo on corruption under the power-sharing government (Cited in: Allen, 
2009) 
The African continent has seen decades of fraudulent elections which have made a 
mockery of its leaders’ commitment to democracy (The Economist, 2008). With 
Kenya's relatively strong civil society and history of elections, many observers hoped 
it would set a positive example in elections in December 2007 (Economist, 2008). 
Sadly this was not the case. Evidence of fraud led to the nation descending into a 
mayhem of 'rampant ethnic violence' (Country Review, 2010: 18). The country had 
'exploded' and Kenya's image of stability was in tatters (Dowden, 2008: 89). The 
aftermath of this violence, however, has led to the establishment of a new 
constitution and a power-sharing government. Many believed the new emphasis on 
civil rights and renewed dedication to end corruption would transform Kenyan politics. 
It has been described as Kenya's 'rebirth' (Greste, 2010). 
Despite this optimism, real change in Kenya faces a significant obstacle in the 
entrenched interests of Kenya's political elites. These individuals have dominated 
Kenyan political and economic development since independence, utilising the state 
apparatus to extract the wealth of the state to enrich themselves, a phenomena 
Ghanian economist George Ayittey describes as the 'African Vampire State' (1999: 
151). Implementing real change is counter to the elite's interests, as relinquishing 
control of the state is to relinquish their opportunities for 'self-enrichment' (Economist, 
2008). This paper argues that the events of 2007 – 2008 have had little impact on the 
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persistence of what democratisation theorists describe as dominant power politics in 
Kenyan political discourse. The roots of the 'Vampire State' are too deep to be 
undone by the formulation of a new constitution. 
Carothers (2002: 7) described the key features of a ‘dominant’ power system as a 
state with some basic features of democracy and 'real political space'; yet a single 
party/leader dominates the system with 'little prospect of alternation of power in the 
foreseeable future' (Carothers, 2002: 8). Huntingdon (1991: 33) defined this type of 
non-democratic system as a 'personal dictatorship'. A key problem in dominant power 
states is 'the blurring of the line between the state and the ruling party' (Ibid), which 
means state assets - police, state funding etc - are shifted into the party’s hands. This 
leads to 'large-scale corruption and crony capitalism' (Ibid). Dominant power elections 
are generally 'dubious' affairs (Ibid), with the state simply putting on a good enough 
electoral show to appease the international community. Writing during Daniel Arap 
Moi's Presidency, Carothers argued Kenya fitted into the category of 'dominant power 
politics' (2002: 7). The validity of that belief and the extent to which the new 




Kenya inherited a colonial legacy from the UK; prior to independence the UK 
established a liberal democratic institution for independent Kenyan governance, but 
its institutions were particularly weak. These institutions were installed almost 
overnight, imposed with a lack of democratic history, pluralism or even political 
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parties (Thompson, 2000: 23).  A more positive result of the colonial legacy was 
occasional direct British support; such as when Great Britain intervened to prevent a 
military coup in 1964 (Thompson, 2000: 146).  
Within a year of Kenya's independence the two main parties merged, effectively 
removing any opposition parties (Murunga et al, 2007: 67). President Kenyatta 
removed key checks and balances, becoming a de facto 'absolute ruler' (Nyinguro et 
al, 2007: 7). Kenyatta achieved particularly high levels of government control through 
a series of government moves increasing centralisation of power in the executive, 
whilst also instituting devolution and banning formal opposition (Ibid). Erosion of the 
separation of powers was completed by President Moi (Adar et al, 2001: 1). Despite 
this, there were still 'relatively' open elections up to 1981, however the opposition 
were often manipulated by the government and split (along mainly ethnic lines); for 
example, in 2006 there were 26 separate political parties (Ayittey, 2005: 241).  
Weakness of state institutions meant Kenyatta's opportunities to expand power over 
the state and practise wide-scale corruption were 'dismayingly abundant' (Joseph, 
2008: 7), with abuses committed constantly (Ibid). Wafula Okumu stated, 'despite 
spending years in colonial incarceration [Kenyatta] used methods worse than those 
used by the colonizers to silence their critics' (2002). Parliament was ineffective as 
power was centralised in the executive, with executive powers gradually expanded 
until 1992, by which point President Moi's de facto dictatorship could restrict freedom 
of demonstration, elect high court judges and had reduced parliament to a 'rubber 
stamp of policies' (Adar, 2000: 79). In 1982 a constitutional amendment made Kenya 
an official single party state (Murunga et al, 2007: 32). This action clarifies the validity 
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of describing Kenya's democratic transition as one defined by dominant power 
politics.  
These factors have a direct link with Kenya's failure to uphold basic human rights 
from independence to the present day. President Kenyatta removed serious threats 
to his power with disregard for human rights (Ibid). Repression of anti-government 
figures continued more severely under President Moi from 1972 onwards, with a 
myriad of human rights violations by the government (Adar et al, 2001: 2). This was 
made possible by Moi's centralisation of power, control of state institutions and 
security forces. Protection of human rights was rendered impossible by the 
government's control of the judicial system, which was being 'blatantly contravened 
by those who are supposed to be its supreme guardians' (Adar et al, 2001: 5). The 
results were his use of draconian laws; authorising detentions, political trials, torture, 
arbitrary arrests and police brutality; utilised at levels seen under colonial rule in 
Kenya (Okumu, 2002).  Moi perceived human rights as alien, inconsistent with 
African values and culture and 'Euro-centric' (Adar et al, 2001: 6) and a person was 
no longer equal unless they belonged to the ruling political party (Ayittey, 2005: 96). 
This strongly supports the notion of a dominant power system, confirming Kenya was 
in the pre-transition (Bratton, 1994: 10) of democratisation, primarily through Moi's 
emasculation of Kenyan civil society (Ibid). 
Civil society and the media played a key role in the restoration of multi-party 
democracy from the 1980s to 1991. The state was wary of the potential for NGOs to 
rival the power of government and accordingly restricted their influence within Kenya 
(Wanyande, 1996: 8). However, international pressure grew strongly in the 1980s to 
bring in NGOs to reboot Kenya's stagnant economy. Bratton asserted that, in the pre-
7 
transition phase of democratisation, protests against government rule often begin 
with economic concerns (1994: 10). This point is proven correct, as concerns over 
the economy and engagement from NGO's did lead - as the government feared - to 
increased political involvement from civil society (Wanyande, 1996: 10). This 
evidence supports Huntingdon's assertion that non-democratic regimes are more 
likely to democratise when political competition against the incumbent increases 
(1991: 33). 
When groups began to challenge the government over human rights and 
constitutional change, the media was crucial to any movement for democratic change 
(Wanyande, 1996: 1). This is despite Moi's use of the state apparatus to restrict 
threats against his regime (Adar, 2000: 83). The movement finally succeeded in 
reinstating multi-party democracy in 1991. This followed the International Monetary 
Fund's (IMF) suspension of foreign aid to Kenya, after nationwide demonstrations 
were violently suppressed (Thompson, 2000: 153). This was civil society's reaction to 
the continuation of dominant power political discourse. 
Following the switch to multi-party democracy in 1991, Moi was unwilling to cede 
power. This is a feature commonly seen in personal dictatorships (Huntingdon, 1991: 
40). Moi became an expert in manipulating voters based on engineered fears of 
ethnic violence. Moi embarked on a disastrous campaign of ethnic violence (Brown, 
2004: 8). His actions led to thousands being killed and hundreds of thousands 
displaced (Ibid). As a result, Moi won two elections between 1991 and 2002 after 
creating an undoubtedly unfair electoral climate. There was clear evidence of ballot 
box stuffing and 'gerrymandering' (Brown, 2004: 3). This confirms Kenya's continued 
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position in the 'pre-transition'  phase of democratic transition: where Moi previously 
banned political parties, he now controlled elections(Bratton, 1994: 10). 
Moi had grown adept at 'selling the same packages of reforms several times' (Guest, 
2010: 50). For example, he established a commission of enquiry dealing with 
corruption, to appease the IMF; then proceeded to pass a law in parliament declaring 
it unconstitutional (Ayittey, 2005: 331). The switch to multi-party democracy had done 
little to remove Moi's control of state institutions; for example, in 2000, Moi supporters 
attacked opposition leaders outside parliament, but when the police arrived they 
inexplicably arrested the opposition leaders (Ayittey, 2005: 441).  Despite the switch 
to multi-party democracy, the basic institutional structure of authoritarian and 
repressive rule had remained intact (Human Rights Watch, 1991: 55).  
With reference to a history of repressive, single party rule, it is surprising then that in 
2002 there was a decisive election victory for the opposition whereby power was 
peacefully transferred (Brown, 2004: 3). This counters Huntingdon’s belief that 
personal dictators do not relinquish power voluntarily (Huntingdon, 1991: 40). Key to 
the peaceful transfer of power were bi-partisan parliamentary reforms in 1997; these 
reforms revised oppressive laws, improved civil rights and made for more credible 
elections (Country Review, 2010: 10). Following this, the opposition were unified, 
there was a far more independent media (with a greater readership) and a shift in 
popular attitudes against the status quo, following a greater level of civic education 
(Brown, 2004: 3). This shows the democratisation of Kenya had seen a decade of 
political liberalisation, resulting in a political transition where the incumbent 
government concedes power (Bratton, 1994: 10). This puts Kenya's democratic 
transition in a position where the new government – under President Kibaki – could 
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relinquish executive control of state institutions, reversing dominant power politics 
within Kenya. 
Post-Independence Economics 
The pervasive state control of the Kenyatta and Moi Presidencies had severe 
economic implications, due to the wide-scale cronyism and corruption associated 
with dominant power political systems. These economic implications will be 
assessed, as will their contribution to the contemporary Kenyan political context. 
Throughout post-independence, Kenyan state institutions have been crippled by 
rampant corruption. The corruption in Kenya is described by United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) as so vast that Kenya is generally seen as 
one of the 'most corrupt countries on the planet' (Country Review, 2010: 14). Brown 
believes that corruption is such a major issue that any democratic transition in Kenya 
ends when 'political elites assume power' (2004: 3). For example, in 1992 Kenya lost 
$600m on non-existent gold and diamond exports, 10% of the country's GDP, in what 
was referred to as the Goldenberg scandal (BBC, 2004). Corruption has dominated 
Kenyan politics and continues to do so in the present day. 
Corruption and overarching government control of state resources and institutions 
have led to mixed economic performance. Upon independence the colonial legacy 
had left some positive elements for a successful economy, including a good 
communications infrastructure, basic health services, an education system and 
regionally strong industrial production  (Thompson, 2000: 23). However, this was 
mixed with an economy focused on cash crops; meaning the economy fluctuated 
according to world coffee prices - a source of economic instability (Ibid).  
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In Kenya's early post-independence period there was a high level of success, with 
GDP growth averaging 6.6% annually during 1964 – 73 (Fashoyin, 2001: 1). This 
was a result of mass distribution of farmland to the peasantry to stimulate 
employment (Chewya, 2006: 12). Also benefiting growth was investment in 
infrastructure, state-led capitalism, political stability and the creation of a fertile 
climate for investment (aided by strong western relations)  (Fashoyin, 2001: 1). 
These factors have often seen Kenyatta's policies lauded as a success. However, 
this is misleading, Kenya's economy was very vulnerable to market fluctuations and 
sustained a major shock in 1973 (Jerven, 2011: 19). Closer analysis suggests that 
Kenyatta's oversight of the economy was unexceptional (Jerven, 2011: 20), the 
reasons for will now be identified. 
Successful earlier policies were scuppered through mismanagement or negative 
government interference. The agrarian settlement schemes failed (Chewya, 2006: 
12). The system instead returned to characteristically pre-colonial subsistence 
farming (Ibid). State ownership of certain parts of the economy was justified by 
arguments that state-led development would better serve the people's interests, 
however this soon led to corruption and political patronage (Chewya, 2006: 15). For 
example, the government's focus in its agrarian projects had been on political 
patronage, as opposed to real economic growth (Ibid). This theme also became 
relevant with the nationalisation of industries, state-led schemes suffered from 
inefficiency and a 'bloated public sector' (Fashoyin, 2001: 1). Government policies 
and corruption soon led to a government invasion of the private sector, with 
industries 'transformed into instruments for non-capitalist pursuits' (Ibid). President 
Kenyatta used legislation under a nation building pretence as an excuse to further 
centralise power within the executive. For example, Kenyatta centralised control over 
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the trade unions (Nyinguro et al, 2007: 7). This is a prime example of the leadership 
increasing its control over the state apparatus for personal benefit, with policies of 
patronage. Such acts were not in the interest of Kenya, but of Kenya's ruling elite, 
clear evidence of a dominant power system. 
The government's policies worked against success, halting economic growth 
(Chewya, 2006: 13). This led to a severe level of unemployment (Ochieng, 1992: 
308) and a state decaying under de facto one party rule (Brown, 2004: 1). Moi's 
policy of political patronage contributed heavily to the economic decline, preferring 
'loyalty over competence' (Adar, 2000: 76). This climate of rampant corruption and 
the domestic exploitation of state resources epitomised Ayittey's description of the 
'Vampire State'; dominant executives utilising state control for personal benefit (1999: 
157). He describes Moi's regime as one of the prime examples of governments using 
the state for personal benefits (Ibid). 
The complete mismanagement of the economy led to strong international pressure 
on Kenya to seek assistance in the 1980s from the IMF and World Bank (Wanyande, 
1996: 8). It had become clear that state policies had prevented Kenya from 
possessing the financial, human and infrastructural capacity to develop successfully 
(Ibid). Foreign involvement stabilised economic growth, however by 1990 inflation 
exploded and GDP growth fell to 1.4% (USAID, 2006: 1). The IMF suspended aid in 
1991 following perceived governmental problems and clear violation of IMF set 
economic targets (World Bank,1996: 2). Following this, the IMF implemented wide 
ranging economic reform, including a reduction in public sector employment and the 
privatisation of several large publicly owned companies (Hussain, 1994: 28). 
Opposition from political elites continued in the face of IMF reforms (Hussain, 1994: 
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25). Up to this point government policies had failed; policies of patronage and 
corruption had  damaged the economy - and continued to do so. There was a clear 
lack of good economic governance within Kenya, supporting the application of the 
'Vampire State' definition. 
Since the early 1990s, Kenya’s economic performance has been weaker than the 
average in Sub-Saharan Africa and the weakest among the members of the East 
African Community (Kalinga et al, 2004: 5). The IMF, World Bank and Western 
institutions have blamed widely fluctuating growth on continuing corruption (Ibid). 
Substantial economic growth in the mid-1990s ended when, in 1997, the Moi regime 
failed to uphold governance reforms regarding corruption, which led to a second 
suspension of IMF lending, followed by a withholding of World Bank and European 
Commission aid (Africa Recovery, 1997). The economy again began to stagnate, 
contracting 0.2% in 2000 (World Bank, 2011). Growth spiked to 4.5% in 2001 before 
again lowering to just 0.5% in 2002 (OECD, 2006: 347). However, from 2002, 
President Kibaki - a former economist - oversaw sustained economic growth, rising to 
6% in 2006 (Ibid). 
2007 – 2008 Political Crisis 
This historical analysis affirms Carother's belief that Kenya was an example of a 
dominant power political system, under Presidents Kenyatta and Moi. Kenya fulfilled 
almost all of the criteria of a dominant power system as state mechanisms were 
clearly under the personal control of the President. Civil society's reaction in the 
1980s and 1990s did force a return to multi-party democracy. The 2002 election 
victory for the opposition, where Mwai Kibaki was sworn in as President, signified the 
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end of the Moi regime. However, the opposition's election victory did not end the 
dominant power structures of Kenyan politics. 
President Kibaki had been elected in 2002 with a mandate to fight corruption and 
oversee judicial reforms (Kieh, 2007: 140). However, Kibaki displayed similar signals 
of bad governance to the previous regime. He displayed clear evidence of corruption 
(Dowden, 2008: 89), raids on newspapers (Jarso, 2010: 73)  and state oppression 
(Brown, 2004: 13). Kibaki had become the epitome of the 'big man dictator' (Dowden, 
2008: 89). When protests formed over the stalling of reforms in 2004, demonstrations 
were violently broken up, with police reportedly using live rounds against the 
demonstrators (Brown, 2004: 13).  
Notable was a public scandal where the anti-corruption chief John Githongo was 
forced to flee after discovering major corruption in Kibaki's inner circle (Keane, 2006). 
In 2005 an unpopular constitutional proposal to consolidate power in the executive – 
a signal of resurgent corruption – led to riots in Nairobi, which again turned violent 
(Country Review, 2010: 17). Most Kenyans became disillusioned with the Kibaki 
regime (Murunga et al, 2007: 10). It is clear the structure of Kenyatta and Moi's 
dominant power system had remained intact under President Kibaki. 
The most significant event of Kibaki's term, however, came following evidence that 
the 2007 elections were rigged, which led to wide-scale ethnic violence. This crisis 
resulted in thousands of people being killed, with thousands more displaced (Ibid). 
Those orchestrating the violence came from both political parties, including high 
ranking government officials, as well as policemen (Human Rights Watch, 2011). The 
Economist (2008) reported at the time,  “Kenya's president steals an election, 
showing utter contempt for democracy and his people.” The reluctance of Kibaki to 
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relinquish power, in addition to the negative developments within Kenya under his 
Presidency showed a return to Huntingdon's personal dictator thesis (Huntingdon, 
1991: 40). Only after then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan intervened to calm the 
situation was comparative stability restored, and a power-sharing agreement was 
signed in 2008. This power-sharing government implemented a new constitution, with 
the promise of wide-ranging reforms (Greste, 2011) 
Aftermath of the Crisis 
Domestic opinions of the political climate in Kenya following the passage of the 
constitution were highly optimistic. The new constitution indeed had the potential to 
make significant and positive changes to the Kenyan political system. It would 
address many of the major issues of governance and human rights; Kenyan political 
analyst Kwamchetsi Mokhoke stated 'this new constitution tackles all those issues 
and more' (Ibid). More significant changes included the establishment of a citizens’ 
bill of rights, constitutional limits on the number of cabinet posts, reduction of the 
president's powers and devolution of power to regions (BBC, 2010). The government 
was also confident that the measures taken would greatly reduce corruption; for 
example, 'land grabbing' was banned, which the government stated amounted to 
30% of corruption (Kenyan Government, 2011). The BBC went so far as to say the 
power-sharing government had 'suddenly made war' (Okwembah, 2010) on 
corruption. Whether such efforts – credible or not – have been sustained, will be 
explored further on. 
International views of Kenya's recent political changes were also very positive. The 
World Bank Country Director for Kenya, Johannes Zutt stated, 'It is hard to imagine a 
future Kenya where these constitutional changes do not have an impact—for the 
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better', citing the potential of renewed checks and balances in the country (Zutt, 
2010). The White House was also supportive of changes, declaring a 'promising new 
chapter' in Kenyan politics (AFP, 2010). The White House has been particularly 
encouraged by the actions of President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga in the 
power-sharing government (Ibid). 
The people celebrated what they described as the 'rebirth' of Kenya (Greste, 2010). 
There was a widely shared belief that the power-sharing government had engineered 
a document which has the potential to positively transform Kenyan political discourse 
(Ibid). Many analysts believe the constitution is a result of the Kenyan people's fury 
after the 2007 elections, with Kibaki having to make major concessions to stay in 
power; government critic and anti-corruption activist John Githongo stated, 'the 
Kenyan people have imposed a constitution upon their rulers' (Royal African Society, 
2010). This represents a significant change in Kenyan politics, which could effectively 
end the prevalence of dominant power politics. 
The economic situation following this major crisis has been surprisingly optimistic. 
The crisis led to economic growth retracting to just 2.2%, from 7% the previous year 
(World Bank, 2011). However, once the crisis was resolved, the economy was 
stabilised and in fact growth increased in 2009 (World Bank Website, 2011). Foreign 
observers have noted that the power-sharing government's involvement in the 
economy is becoming more positive; pro-active government policies have led to 
mostly positive economic developments (World Bank, 2010: 2). This has sparked 
optimism from the IMF and World Bank as to Kenya's economic growth (IMF 
Website, 2011). Foreign observers believed the new constitution would have a 
positive effect on the economy, the World Bank stating that it would be a key factor 
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for renewed economic growth (World Bank, 2010). This is buoyed by recent 
investment in infrastructure and overall positive economic management. Foreign 
observers are optimistic that the current government and passage of the constitution 
can lead to good economic governance. 
However, despite this wide ranging optimism, in 2008 domestic voices remained 
sceptical of the potential impact the new constitution would have. The pledges to 
confront the issue of corruption were viewed with particular scepticism, with it being 
such a systemic issue in Kenyan politics. This is particularly apt with reference to 
many previous broken promises, such as President Moi's constitutional reforms in 
1999, in which he pledged to crack down on corruption (BBC, 1999), the results of 
which were a failure. From other areas of Kenyan civil society there was also 
scepticism as to whether reforms would be implemented properly; John Githongo 
believed that the popular and radical constitution would face “A major counter-reform 
initiative by [those with] vested interests [in the status quo]' (Royal African Society, 
2010), as political elites begin to resist any changes. 
Recent Developments 
The signs of such a 'counter-reform initiative' are becoming increasingly clear in 
Kenyan politics, interestingly from both sides of the power-sharing government (Allen 
2009). The impact of a power-sharing agreement is seen as counteractive to 
democratic reform, as it instead 'undermine[s] the functioning of parliamentary 
opposition parties' (LeVan, 2011: 43), negating an important check on the executive.  
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This factor has contributed to renewed government corruption. Kenya has seen a 
series of corruption scandals in the last two years1. Recently even the leaders 
themselves have been implicated: Prime Minister Odinga in a maize scandal and 
President Kibaki in unsound deals over oil (Allen 2009). Additionally, reminiscent of 
the controversy surrounding John Githongo under Kibaki's previous government was 
the forced exit of anti-corruption chief Lumumba (Reuters Africa, 2011). As a result, 
the BBC reported that NGO Transparency International's survey in 2010 rated 
Kenya's level of corruption at joint 154th, alongside Cambodia, whilst Mugabe's 
Zimbabwe was better perceived at 133rd (Okwembah, 2010). This parallels the 
recent Wikileaks revelations, US diplomatic cables stating that the Kenyan cabinet is 
the most corrupt in Africa (Mutiga, 2010). One must also recognise, however, that the 
discovery of such scandals highlights the success of the media's oversight (Jarso, 
2010: 66). 
This shift back to dominant power politics and the 'Vampire State' is not the only 
negative development since the agreement in 2008. The power-sharing agreement 
has created a 'crisis of dual sovereignty', as both elites and civil society view the 
coalition government as two separate governments (LeVan, 2011: 45). This links to a 
failure to fulfil the reforms promised by the power-sharing government and the new 
constitution, Kofi Annan describing the two parties as 'losing momentum' (Allen 2009) 
in the reform process. The reason for this can be attributed to a lack of cooperation 
between the two groups. John Githongo describes both groups as having their 
'snouts in the trough' (Ibid) with little imperative to make reforms. For example, the 
                                                 
1  See [BBC- 'Kenyan minister facing corruption claims resigns'] ; [The Telegraph- 'Two Kenyan 
ministers suspended in corruption scandal'] ; [Mosoku- 'MPs Warn Raila On Corrupt Ministers'] 
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'Africa Center for Open Government' has complained that not only are Kenya’s 
ministers some of the highest paid in the world, but many of the ministerial portfolios 
are 'pointless' (LeVan, 2011: 15). This is in spite of promises to reform cabinet 
positions under the new constitution (Greste, 2010). 
The head of Transparency International in Kenya, Job Ogonda, has described the 
stalemate between the two groups as so detrimental to social and anti-corruption 
reforms, it has highlighted the risk of Kenya 'degenerating to a failed state' (Ross, 
2010). African research network 'Institute for Strategic Studies' has described the 
process of implementing the constitution as 'like shooting a moving target' (Asamoah 
et al, 2011). 
This stalling of progress has had negative implications for the human rights situation 
within Kenya, including a public spat with the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Despite some positive changes, including some reform of the judiciary (Asamoah et 
al, 2011), reforms to strengthen human rights within the state have largely stalled. 
Intimidation of human rights activists and the media in general has continued (Ross, 
2010); in one high profile incident, two activists were shot by unknown gunmen in 
broad daylight and students protesting about these shootings were fired upon by 
police (CNN, 2009). These activists had contributed to a 'scathing' (Ibid) United 
Nations report on police brutality within Kenya. It is clear the apparatus of state 
oppression remains largely unaffected by the new constitution. Jarso states that, 
institutionally, 'Kenya needs to move beyond mere aspirations' (2010: 87). 
The controversy surrounding the trials of those implicated in the 2007 – 2008 election 
crisis has been a high-profile crisis in Kenyan politics. The failure of the parties to 
cooperate properly, combined with general scepticism of domestic justice systems, 
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has meant that a domestic special tribunal could not be formed to try those 
individuals who funded and spurred on the violence (Allen, 2009). As a result of this 
inaction, the ICC has stepped in - with the begrudging agreement of the government 
- indicting six individuals (The Economist, 2010a). Among these are Kenya's top civil 
servant, finance minister and former head of police (The Economist, 2011). One 
official is also the son of former President Kenyatta (Plessis, 2011). The six suspects 
are evenly split between Odinga's and Kibaki's allies (BBC, 2010). 
Kenya is a member of the Rome Statute, under which the ICC has jurisdiction to 
investigate serious crimes against humanity if the state in question has not conducted 
a satisfactory investigation themselves (ICC, 2011). Kenya already had a difficult 
relationship with the ICC after inviting Sudan's President Bashir to their constitution 
signing, despite the President having a warrant from the ICC on charges of – among 
others – genocide (Rice, 2010). According to its obligations to the ICC, Kenya should 
have arrested Bashir and extradited him to the Hague. Wide ranging criticism of 
Kenya's decision came from Kofi Annan, President Obama, the EU and various 
human rights groups (Sudan Tribune, 2010). 
Max du Plessis has described the reaction by Kenya's elites as a “reactive overdrive” 
(Plessis, 2011), which has seen Kenya attempt to raise regional support for a new 
domestic trial (The Economist, 2011). This is a continent with a frosty history with the 
ICC; many African states condemn the ICC's activities on the continent (Plessis, 
2010: 32). However, recently the relationship – whilst difficult – is improving, with 
African Union (AU) states discussing the prospect of a regional ICC liaison office 
(Sibalukhulu, 2010). Continued Kenyan objections have culminated in Parliament 
passing a resolution in December 2010 calling for Kenya's withdrawal from the Rome 
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Statute (Plessis, 2011). This shows Kenyan opposition to the ICC is not along 
common lines with other AU states, but is in accordance with the interests of Kenya’s 
ruling elites, which in this case is the protection of the ICC's suspects.  
This is a particularly worrying development for Kenya's political progress. The 2007 – 
2008 crisis was a hideous episode in Kenyan history. The new constitution promised 
a new era for Kenyan politics, but instead the government is working to provide 
impunity to the architects of the violence. It is comical that a year ago Prime Minister 
Odinga made clear he would send anyone to the Hague, even more so when the ICC 
only became involved because of the government's inability to form a tribunal over a 
two year period (The Economist, 2011). This is all the more worrying when one 
assesses civil society's reaction to the government’s decision. The Economist (2011) 
cited a local opinion poll, which suggested 73% of Kenyans support the involvement 
of the ICC. There is a similar lack of dedication to providing witness protection 
standards, which only feeds the perception that the state is 'intent on shielding 
perpetrators of serious crimes' (Sibalukhulu, 2011). This situation is damning of 
Kibaki and Odinga's dedication to human rights, particularly in such a high-profile 
situation.  
In addition to the ICC controversy, there have been some major developments in 
Kenyan politics over the last year. In October 2011 Kenya invaded Southern 
Somalia, with the aim of combating militant Islamist group al-Shabaab (Rémy, 2011). 
However, following reprisal attacks from al-Shabaab, Kenya's Somalian community 
has come under increasing discrimination, being targeted for arbitrary beatings by 
Kenyan defence forces (Howden, 2011). Additionally, International Crisis Group have 
cited a former military officer who argued one purpose of the war was to distract 
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Kenyans from domestic politics and specifically the forthcoming elections (ICG, 2012: 
3).  
The impending elections, due to take place in March 2013 (Macharia, 2012), have 
displayed signs that they may descend into similar levels of violence seen in the 2007 
– 2008 crisis. The BBC has reported that rival ethnic groups have begun to rearm in 
readiness for violence, with arms dealers illegally distributing automatic weapons 
(BBC, 2009). The date of the election itself has become a controversial issue, as the 
constitution dictated that it should have been held August 2012, but following 
government pressure, the Kenyan High Court has moved the election date to March 
2013. This decision was made against the wishes of the Kenyan people (Macharia, 
2012) and against the advice of the 'Commission for the Implementation of the 
Constitution', an independent body established to oversee the implementation of the 
new constitution, which announced it was 'alarmed' by the justification for the 
decision (Richardson, 2011). This evidence, combined with the controversy 
surrounding the ICC, demonstrates that political conditions within Kenya appear 
unchanged by the new constitution, which is already being undermined. It is clear 
Kenya's democratic transition remains heavily influenced by dominant power politics. 
In contrast, the optimism for economic progress in Kenya, under the power-sharing 
government, appears to be better founded. President Kibaki's economic successes 
prior to the election scandal appear to be continuing under the power-sharing 
agreement, with World Bank figures suggesting economic growth rose to 5.3% in 
2010 (IMF Website, 2011). Kenyan businesses praised strong development in 
communications and infrastructure prior to the election crisis, claiming Kenya could 
become the next 'call-centre capital' (Crilly, 2007). This positive investment appears 
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to have continued under the power-sharing government, with investment sparking 
hopes of an 'information-technology boom' (The Economist, 2010b).  
Accordingly, official government sources cite Kibaki's policies as the reason for 
renewed economic success, emphasising Kenya's planned transition to First World 
status after launching Kibaki's long term policy, 'Vision 2030' (Kenyan Government, 
2011). Whilst there is evidence for direct success from Kibaki's policies, other 
positive factors influencing the economy include renewed tourism and strong market 
demand for Kenyan commodities such as tea (Reuters Africa, 2011). 
Despite this solid economic growth, negative political developments have the 
potential to make a severe impact on foreign investment and general economic 
performance. Strong reasons for the renewed optimism from foreign investors and 
the IMF were the seemingly more credible efforts to deal with corruption laid out by 
the new constitution (World Bank, 2011); thus the series of corruption scandals 
represent a severe concern. Recalling Job Ogonda's remarks on the potential for a 
'political meltdown' (Ross, 2010), it is clear the future of the economy has the 
potential to be unstable. 
Conclusion 
The evidence presenting itself is deeply pessimistic. The apparatus of the 'Vampire 
State' appears to have remained intact despite the optimism surrounding the new 
constitution. The prevailing feature of Kenyan politics has been the survivability of 
elite, self-interested individuals in power. The events of 2007 – 2008 have not led to 
the removal of these elements; in contrast, we have seen the creation of the crisis of 
dual sovereignty, translating to a crisis of governmental inaction. The cronyism and 
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hypocrisy surrounding the suspects indicted by the ICC is an insight into the lack of 
integrity of the Kibaki and Odinga administration. The power-sharing government's 
inability to bring to justice those individuals orchestrating the violence in 2007 – 2008, 
is seen as a betrayal by many in Kenya (Allen 2009). 
This cycle of crisis, false promises and eventual continuation of the status quo has 
pervaded the political system since Moi's 'reforms' in 1991. What is the likely effect of 
renewed corrupt practices for the economy? World Bank surveys have reinforced 
previous recommendations for the development of Kenya's economy, including 
strong efforts to battle corruption and investment in communications and 
infrastructure whilst maintaining a stable climate for investment (World Bank, 2010). It 
is questionable whether investment  and economic management will be safe from 
negative interference, or indeed whether the  political climate will stay stable, leaving 
Kenya with an uncertain economic future. In short, dominant power politics appears 
to have remained an unshakeable part of Kenyan politics and the events of 2008 












Adar, K. & Munyae, I (2001), 'Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi 1978-2001', African 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 1 
Adar, K (2000), 'The Internal and External Contexts of Human Rights Practises in Kenya: Daniel Arap Moi's 
Operational Code', African Sociological Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 74-96 
Africa Recovery, United Nations (1997), 'European Commission joins IMF in withholding aid to Kenya', Africa 
Recovery, United Nations, Vol. 11, No. 2 
Allen, K. (2009), 'Has Kenya's power-sharing worked?', BBC News, Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7921007.stm  
Asamoah, A. & Githaiga, N (2011), 'Implementing Kenya’s Constitution Like Shooting at a Moving Target', 
Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), Available at: http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1363  
Associated Press (2010), 'White House praises Kenya constitution move'   Associated Free Press, Available at: 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iVG2Y5iYenMExqFjUuJm4ZcdpYIg&followup=ht
tp://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5 
Ayittey, G. (1999), 'Africa in Chaos', Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke 
Ayittey, G (2005), 'Africa Unchained', Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke 
BBC News (2010), 'Kenya election violence: ICC names suspects', BBC News, Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11996652  
BBC News (2010), 'Kenya president ratifies new constitution', BBC News, Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11106558   
BBC News (2011), 'Kenyan minister facing corruption claims resigns', BBC News, Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12110471 
BBC News (2009), 'Kenyans 'rearming for 2012 poll', BBC News, Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8293745.stm  
BBC News (1999), 'Moi pledges to weed out corruption', BBC News, Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/470788.stm  
BBC News (2004), 'Moi 'ordered' Goldenberg payment', BBC News, Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3495689.stm  
Bratton, M (1994), 'Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa,' Institute for Development Research Reports, 
Vol. 11, No. 6, pp. pp. 1-21 
Brown, S (2004), ‘Theorizing Kenya’s Protracted Transition to Democracy’, Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 325-342 
Carothers, T. (2002) ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, January, No. 1, pp. 
5-21 
Chewya, L (2006), 'Reversing Rural Poverty In An African Country: A Review Of The Kenyan Policy Regime', 
Paper Presented at the ‘Mijadala on Social Policy, Governance and Development in Kenya’ sponsored by 
Development Policy Management Forum on 26 October 2006 at Holiday Inn, Nairobi 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2009), 'The CIA World Factbook 2010', Skyhorse Publishing Inc 
CNN (2009), 'Human rights activists killed in Kenya', CNN News, Available at: http://articles.cnn.com/2009-03-
06/world/kenya.activists_1_kenyan-police-human-rights-kenyatta-national-hospital?_s=PM:WORLD  
Country Watch (2010), ‘Kenyan Country Review: Political Conditions’, Country Watch Publication, July 2010. 
pp. 9-22 
Crilly, R (2007) 'Why Kenya could be world's latest call-center capital', The Times, Available at: 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/markets/africa/article3084915.ece 
Dowden, R (2008), 'Africa:  Altered States, Ordinary Miracles', Portobello Books Ltd: London 
Fashoyin, T (2001),'Social Dialogue and Social and Economic Development in Kenya', International Labour 
Office Publication 
Greste. P (2010), 'Kenya's new constitution sparks hopes of rebirth',BBC News, Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11103008  
Guest, R (2010), 'The Shackled Continent', Smithsonian Books: Washington 
25 
Howden, D (2011), 'UN-backed invasion of Somalia spirals into chaos', The Independent, Available at: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/unbacked-invasion-of-somalia-spirals-into-chaos-
6276959.html  
Human Rights Watch (1991), 'Human Rights Watch World Report 1992', Human Rights Watch Publication 
Human Rights Watch (2011), 'ICC: Justice Advances in Kenya Case', Human Rights Watch, Available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/09/icc-justice-advances-kenya-case   
Huntingdon, S (1991), 'How Countries Democratise', Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 4, pp. 579-616  
Husain, I (1994), 'Why Do Some Economies Adjust More Successfully Than Others? Lessons from Seven 
African Countries', World Bank Publication 
International Crisis Group (2012), 'The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia', International Crisis Group, 
Africa Report, No. 184 
International Monetary Fund (2011), 'Kenya and the IMF', Website of the International Monetary Fund, 
Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/country/ken/index.htm  
Jarso, J (2010), 'The Media and the Anti-Corruption Crusade in Kenya: Weighing the Achievements, Challenges 
and Prospects', American University International Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 33-88 
Jerven, M (2011), 'Revisiting the consensus on Kenyan economic growth, 1964-95', Journal of Eastern African 
Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 2-23 
Joseph, R (2008), ‘Progress and Retreat in Africa: Challenges of a “Frontier” Region’, Journal of Democracy, 
Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 94-108 
Kalinga & McIntyre & Cheng & Aylward & Tchaidze, R & Lusinya (2004), 'Kenya: Selected Issues and 
Statistical Appendix', International Monetary Fund Publication 
Keane, F. (2006), 'A fearless Kenyan whistle-blower', BBC News, Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4697612.stm  
Kieh, G (2007), 'Beyond state failure and collapse: making the state relevant in Africa', Lexington Books 
Kenyan Government (2011), 'Accountability Statement', Website of the Kenyan Government, Available at: 
http://www.communication.go.ke/development/accountability_summary.asp 
LeVan, C (2011), 'Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa's Uncertain Democracies', Governance, Vol. 
24, No. 1, pp. 31-53 
Macharia, J (2012), 'Update - Kenya high court delays elections to March 2013', Reuters, Available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/13/kenya-elections-idUSL6E8CD1E720120113  
 
Mosoku, G (2010), 'MPs Warn Raila On Corrupt Ministers', Nairobi Star, Available at: 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201011090810.html  
Murunga, G. & Wanjala, S (2007), 'Kenya: the struggle for democracy', Zed Books 
Mutiga, M (2010), 'Wikileaks - US Envoy Brands Ministers Most Corrupt in Africa', The Nation (Nairobi), 
Available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201012120002.html  
Nyinguro, P. & Otenyo, E (2007), ‘Social Movements and Democratic Transitions in Kenya’, Journal of Asian 
and African Studies Vol.4, No. 21, pp. 5-24 
Ochieng, W. & Robert Maxon, R (1992),'An Economic History of Kenya', East African Publishers 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  (2006), '"Kenya", African Economic Outlook 2005 – 
2006', Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Okumu, W (2002), 'Good African Leaders: Who are they and how do we get them?', Perspective Publication 
Okwembah, D. (2010), 'Is Kenya finally getting tough on corruption?', BBC News, Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11728194  
Plessis, M (2011), 'Kenya Again Tests Africa’s Commitment to the ICC', Institute for Security Studies, 
Available at: http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1223  
Plessis, M (2010), 'The International Criminal Court that Africa wants', Institute for Strategic Studies, Vol. 172 
Rémy, J (2011), 'Kenya develops plan for satellite region of Jubaland on Somali border', The Guardian, 
Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/08/somali-fears-in-kenya-conflicts  
Reuters Africa (2011), 'Kenya tea prices up on higher Egypt demand', Reuters Africa, Available at: 
http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE71F07G20110216  
Reuters Africa (2011), 'Factbox-Corruption in Kenya', Reuters Africa, Available at: 
http://af.reuters.com/article/kenyaNews/idAFL5E7K62GY20110909?sp=true  
Rice, X (2010), 'Omar al-Bashir tarnishes Kenya's landmark day', The Guardian. Available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/27/omar-al-bashir-war-crimes-kenya  
Richardson, P (2011), 'Kenyan Constitutional Body Rejects Government Plan to Change Election Date', 
Bloomberg, Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-16/kenyan-constitution-body-rejects-
plan-to-move-elections-to-december.html  
Ross, W (2010), 'Kenya Faces Political 'Meltdown'', BBC News, Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8517338.stm  
26 
Royal African Society (2010), 'John Githongo: What next for Kenya?', Royal African Society, Available at: 
http://www.royalafricansociety.org/country-profiles/669.html  
Sibalukhulu, N (2011), 'Lack of Political will Undermines Witness Protection in Kenya', Institute for Security 
Studies, Available at: http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1257  
Sibalukhulu, N. (2010), 'The AU and the ICC Still not the Best of Friends', Institute for Security Studies, 
Available at: http://www.iss.co.za/iss_today.php?ID=1011  
The Economist (2008), 'Kenya: A very African coup', The Economist, Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/10430289  
The Economist (2010b), 'Outsourcing to Africa: The world economy calls', The Economist, Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/15777592   
The Economist (2011), 'The ICC and Africa: Dim prospects'. The Economist, Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/18176088  
The Economist (2010a), 'The International Criminal Court: Why Africa still needs it', The Economist, Available 
at: http://www.economist.com/node/16274301  
The International Criminal Court (2011), 'ICC at a glance', Website of the International Criminal  Court,   
Available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/  
The Sudan Tribune (2010), 'Kenyan PM says Bashir must stand before ICC, wants apology made to int’l 
community', The Sudan Tribune, Available at: http://www.sudantribune.com/Kenyan-PM-says-Bashir-must-
stand,36117  
The Telegraph (2010), 'Two Kenyan ministers suspended in corruption scandal', The Telegraph, Available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/7237869/Two-Kenyan-ministers-
suspended-in-corruption-scandal.html   
Thompson, A (2000), ‘An Introduction to African Politics’, Routledge: London  
USAID (2006), 'An Economic Snapshot', USAID Kenya Publication 
Wanyande, P. (1996), ‘The Media as Civil Society and Its Role in Democratic Transition in Kenya’, Africa 
Media Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 1-20 
World Bank (2011), 'GDP growth (annual %)', Website of the World Bank, Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG  
World Bank (2011), 'Kenya Economic Update', Website of The World Bank, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/KENYAEXTN/0,,contentMD
K:22600594~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:356509,00.html 
World Bank (2010), 'Kenya Economic Update: Running on One Engine', World Bank Publication 
World Bank (2006), 'Memorandum Of The President Of The International Development Association To The 
Executive Directors On A Country Assistance Strategy Of The World Bank Group For The Republic Of 
Kenya', World Bank Publication 
Zutt, J. (2010), 'A New Constitution for Kenya', World Bank Blog, Available at: 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/a-new-constitution-for-kenya 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
